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COERCION, PROHIBITION,AND GREAT EXPECTATIONS:THE
CONTINUING FAILURE OFTHE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM
SYSTEM
MAARTEN DEN HEIJER, JORRIT RIJPMA AND THOMAS SPIJKERBOER*
Abstract
This contribution explains the European asylum policy crisis from three
structural weaknesses of the Common European Asylum System: its reliance
on coercion within the EU, its unrealistic expectations of what borders can
achieve and the premise of prohibition of refugee movement in its external
dimension. The article then critically reviews the proposals that the EU has
submitted since the publication of the European Migration Agenda in May
2015, in the light of recent developments.
1. Introduction
In Europe, the refugee crisis is first and foremost a policy crisis. Although
as many as 1.5 million irregular migrants may have entered the EU in 2015,
this represents a mere 0.3 percent of the 508 million inhabitants of the
European Union. Yet, the EU was unable to respond effectively to the arrival
of hundreds of thousands of people in Greece and Italy. By consequence,
the system collapsed. The disorderly movements of refugees within the EU
put Schengen in jeopardy and questioned both the ability and willingness of
the Member States to meet their obligations towards refugees.
This article first sets out to explain the events in 2015 from fundamental
flaws in the design of the common European asylum policy. In the first half of
the paper, we identify three paradigms in the common asylum policy that are
not delivering (section 2). First, within the EU, the allocation of asylum
seekers is premised on the false idea of a level playing field, which is
maintained by a system of coercion, leading to constant stress and obstructive
behaviour on the part of both asylum seekers and the Member States. Second,
* Respectively: Assistant professor of international law at the University of Amsterdam;
associate professor of European law at Leiden University, and professor of migration law at the
VU Amsterdam. The authors are grateful to Banafsheh Mogadassi Mahalatti for her research
assistance.
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at the external border, the focus on control and deterrence is misconceived, as
it overestimates, practically as well as legally, the ability of borders to bar
irregular entry or prevent secondary movements. Third, beyond the external
border, the series of prohibitive measures taken to prevent asylum seekers
from arriving at the EU border has not stymied migration but incentivized
migrant smuggling, potentially leading to more instead of less migration. The
difficulties in designing effective policies are moreover exacerbated by the
multi-layered nature of EU governance in the areas of asylum and border
control, which pits national sovereignties against Union values.
Thereafter, in the second half of the article, we critically review whether
the proposals and actions undertaken by the EU since the publication of the
European Agenda on Migration in May 2015 constitute a shift in these
paradigms (section 3).1 Is the EU fundamentally rethinking its policies? We
conclude that, for the most part, the direction which European asylum law and
policy is now taking, reproduces and in important ways intensifies the
structural problems that caused the crisis (section 4).
2. Structural weaknesses of the European asylum policy
2.1. Coercion within the European Union
Secondary movement of asylum seekers within the EU is related to real as
well as to perceived differences in attractiveness of Member States. Apart
from physical safety, important determinants in choosing a destination
country are the presence of family and existing asylum communities,
colonial and linguistic links, geographical proximity, as well as perceptions
about the economic climate, the levels of xenophobia and the country’s
immigration policies.2 Studies further point out that destination choices are
often made during the migration process and often depend on information
and advice provided by human smugglers, as well as on social media.3
1. Commission Communication of 13 May 2015, “A European agenda on migration”,
COM(2015)240 final.
2. Neumayer, “Bogus refugees? The determinants of asylum migration to western Europe”,
49 International Studies Quarterly (2005), at 389–409; Neumayer, “Asylum destination choice:
What makes some European countries more attractive than others?”, 5 European Union
Politics, (2004), at 155–180; Kuschminder, de Bresser and Siegel, “Irreguliere migratieroutes
naar Europa en de factoren die van invloed zijn op de bestemmingskeuze van migranten”,
WODC Working Paper (Maastricht, 2015).
3. Schapendonk, “Turbulent trajectories: African migrants on their way to the European
Union”, 2 Societies (2012), at 27–41.
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The EU is only to a limited extent able to address these disparities between
Member States. The EU cannot directly influence some determinants,
including those which in some studies are identified as the most dominant
ones, namely existing asylum communities and the country’s income level.4
Moreover, despite the reduction of secondary movements by harmonizing
asylum laws being a central aim of the European asylum policy,5 the EU is a
long way from having created a level playing field for asylum seekers.
Recognition rates continue to differ widely,6 and the same is true for
procedural standards, reception conditions and the content of protection.7
Multiple factors contribute to the EU’s failure to create a level playing field.
First, the EU rules on asylum do not comprise a set of fully harmonized
standards. Even though the revision of the asylum directives in 2011–2013
aimed at further approximation (i.e. a uniform status and a common
procedure), they still contain the basic principle that Member States may
introduce or retain more favourable provisions.8 In essence therefore, EU law
only sets a threshold which national legislation must meet. This explains, for
example, why Sweden could decide to immediately grant permanent
residence to Syrian refugees, even though EU law merely requires the
granting of residence for 3 years; and why in Sweden a refugee is allowed to
work immediately upon applying for asylum, in Germany after three months,
in the Netherlands after six months and in France after nine months.9 Second,
refugee status (as well as subsidiary protection status) is legally constructed as
treatment to be accorded on par with nationals in such fields as education,
4. See Neumayer, op. cit. supra note 2; see also Hatton, “Seeking asylum in Europe”,
19 Economic Policy (2004), at 5–62.
5. Directive 2011/95/EU, on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or
stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees
or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted
(recast), O.J. 2011, L 337/9, Recital 13; Directive 2013/32/EU, on common procedures for
granting and withdrawing international protection, O.J. 2013, L 180/60, Recital 13; Directive
2013/33/EU, laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection,
O.J. 2013, L 180/96, Recital 12.
6. When corrected for the varying demographic composition of the asylum population,
recognition rates vary from 25% to almost 70%, see Leerkes, “How (un)restrictive are we?
‘Adjusted’ and ‘expected’ asylum recognition rates in Europe”, WODC Working Paper (The
Hague, 2015). In 2014, recognition rates of Iraqi and Afghan applicants varied prominently and
ranged from 13% to 94% for the first and from 20% to 95% for the latter group of applicants:
see EASO Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the EU (2014), at 27.
7. Ibid. See also EASO Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the EU (2013).
8. Directive 2011/95/EU, Art. 3; Directive 2013/32/EU, Art. 5; Directive 2013/33/EU,
Art. 4.
9. Poptcheva and Stuchlik, “Work and social welfare for asylum-seekers and refugees:
Selected EU Member States”, European Parliamentary Research Service, Dec. 2015.
Common European Asylum System 609
welfare and healthcare.10 As long as these public services fall outside the
remit of the EU, refugee status can simply not become uniform in the EU,
despite proclamations to that effect in various EU policy documents.Third, the
EU directives on asylum require implementation in national law and practice.
This inevitably results in interference with national understandings and
conceptions. Many differences between asylum procedures in the Member
States can be explained from divergent procedural traditions, different
understandings of the role of the judiciary and distinct administrative
environments.11
Different levels of attractiveness of Member States are not necessarily
problematic, as experiences in federal States such as the United States and
Germany show. In Germany, a quota is calculated for each Land taking
account of tax revenues and population size (Königsteiner Schlüssel).12 In the
United States, the federal government works with nine private resettlement
agencies. The agencies match the particular needs of each incoming refugee
with the specific resources available in a local community, giving priority to
the presence of family members and, if these are absent, try to find the best
match between a community’s resources and the refugee’s needs.13 As in
Germany, this tends to allocate refugees to regions and cities that are relatively
wealthy and have low unemployment rates. In both these systems,
socioeconomic factors, play a key if not decisive role.
A problematic factor is that Dublin is founded on an altogether different
idea of allocation. Apart from the preferential position given to
unaccompanied minors and asylum seekers with family members already
residing in a Member state, Dublin disregards the preferences of asylum
seekers and refugees, and builds on the (false) premise of a level playing field
– that it does not matter where the asylum seeker ends up and that, therefore,
he or she does not need to care. Obviously, the asylum seeker does care. This
results in a system in which Member States try to coerce asylum seekers to
subject themselves to an asylum procedure in a particular place, and in
concomitant forms of disobedient behaviour on the part of asylum seekers.
The perverse incentives associated with Dublin have amply been
demonstrated in a range of reports and studies, mentioning such behaviour as
10. See Arts. 22, 23 and 24 of the 1951 Refugee Convention and Arts. 27, 29 and 30 of
Directive 2011/95/EU.
11. Staffans, Evidence in European Asylum Procedures (Martinus Nijhoff, 2012).
12. Thym, “Ein ‘Königsteiner Schlüssel’ für die EU-Flüchtlingspolitik”, Verfassungsblog,
11 Oct. 2013, available at <www.verfassungsblog.de/koenigsteiner-schluessel-fuer-eu-flue
chtlingspolitik/> (all websites last accessed 2 April 2016).
13. United States Department of State, “Refugee resettlement in the United States”, 21 Oct.
2015, available at <www.state.gov/r/pa/pl/249076.htm>.
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avoiding registration, lying about one’s travel route, or cutting off one’s
fingertips.14 That the Dublin system is under constant stress is highlighted by
several more recent studies pointing out its lack of effectiveness.15 In 2013, for
example, of the total of 76,358 requests for transfers, 56,466 were accepted by
the receiving Member States but only 15,938 (20%) were actually carried
out.16 Yet, the tendency is to find solutions in the stricter and more
coercive application of the Dublin rules, including securing fingerprints by
force and systematic detention of asylum seekers who are subject to transfer
decisions.17
Two further features distinguish the U.S. and German systems from that of
the EU. First, the object of distribution is the group of recognized refugees
instead of asylum seekers. Because refugee status determination is a federal
responsibility in Germany and the U.S., there are no issues relating to
diverging reception conditions, procedural standards or eligibility criteria.18
Centralized status determination bypasses many incentives for Member States
and asylum seekers to frustrate the Dublin system. Second, although allocated
to a particular State that may bear special responsibilities towards the refugee,
including responsibility for giving effect to the rights associated with refugee
status,19 in Germany and the U.S. refugees are free to accept employment
14. AWO et al., “Allocation of refugees in the European Union: For an equitable,
solidarity-based system of sharing responsibility”, March 2013, available at <www.proa
syl.de/fileadmin/proasyl/fm_redakteure/STARTSEITE/Memorandum_Dublin_engl.pdf>;
Migreurop, “European borders: Controls, detention and deportation, 2009/2010 Report”,
available at <www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/rapport-migreurop-2010-en_-_2-121110.pdf>.
15. ICF International, “Interim evaluation report Dublin III Regulation”, 4 Dec. 2015;
Guild et al., “New approaches, alternative avenues and means of access to asylum procedures
for persons seeking international protection”, Study for the LIBE Committee, 2014; Guild,
Costello, Garlick and Moreno-Lax, “Enhancing the CEAS and alternatives to Dublin”,
Directorate-General for Internal Policies, available at <www.europarl.europa.eu/Reg
Data/etudes/STUD/2015/519234/IPOL_STU(2015)519234_EN.pdf>; Adviescommissie voor
Vreemdelingenzaken, “Sharing responsibility: A proposal for a European Asylum System on
solidarity”, The Hague, 2015.
16. Fratzke, “Not adding up: The fading promise of Europe’s Dublin System”, March
2015, at 11, available at <www.migrationpolicy.org/research/not-adding-fading-promise-
europes-dublin-system>.
17. E.g., the Commission issued proposals in a Working Document which places
particularly strong emphasis on the importance of fingerprinting all those who arrive, see
Commission Staff Working Document of 27 May 2015 on Implementation of the Eurodac
Regulation as regards the obligation to take fingerprints, SWD(2015)150 final.
18. In the U.S., however, considerable discrepancies in asylum adjudication remain, see
Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz and Schrag, “Refugee roulette: Disparities in asylum
adjudication”, 60 Stanford Law Review (2007), at 295–411.
19. In Joined Cases C-443 & 444/14, Alo and Osso, EU:C:2016:127, the ECJ found that
the imposition of a residence condition on international protection beneficiaries for receiving
social benefits, with the objective of facilitating their integration, did not necessarily run
counter to their right of free of movement guaranteed in Art. 33 Directive 2011/95/EU.
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anywhere in the country and to settle elsewhere. This contributes to economic
dynamism and reduces chances that refugees end up in situations of
unemployment and long-term dependence. A further important effect is that
the initial allocation to a particular State is less consequential, as the refugee
may choose to settle elsewhere later in time. Under EU rules, by contrast, a
conditional right to accept work in another Member State is granted only after
five years of legal residence.20 Under EU law, refugees are trapped in one
particular Member State (except for the right to move freely for up to three
months within the Schengen area in a six-month period),21 which may well be
neither to their liking nor to that of the Member State.
The design of the Common European Asylum System not only leads to
avoidance behaviour of asylum seekers, it also encourages disobedient and
competitive behaviour on the part of Member States. The Dublin system,
together with the method of harmonization, whereby each Member State
remains within certain limits competent to devise its own asylum policy, may
tempt Member States into providing lower levels of protection, for fear of
being inundated by asylum shoppers – the so-called race to the bottom.22
Avoidance behaviour of Member States is reinforced by the sentiment that the
system is fundamentally unfair. The default position of the current system is
that each Member State has to fend for itself, no matter how many asylum
seekers are coming in. The Dublin Regulation simply assigns Greece
responsibility for the hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers who entered
the country irregularly from Turkey. It is striking that at present, the chief
avenue by which relief is provided to countries like Greece and Italy, is simply
by suspending the Common European Asylum System. Italy and Greece
organize their own relief by not registering asylum seekers and stimulating
their secondary migration.23 The other Member States provide relief to
Greece by not applying the Dublin rules in respect of that country. It was only
natural that with the peak of asylum seekers travelling onwards from Greece in
2015, the next countries along the route – Hungary, Slovenia, Austria –
neglected their duties as well.
Statistics predating the current influx already indicated that the Dublin
system leads to considerable disparities among Member States. In 2012,
Member States receiving a disproportionate share of asylum applications
relative to their size or population were wealthy Member States such as
20. Art. 14 Directive 2003/109/EC as amended by Directive 2011/51/EU, O.J. 2011,
L 132/1.
21. Art. 21(1) Schengen Implementing Convention.
22. Described by Noll as “the common market of deflection”; see Noll, Negotiating
Asylum: The EU Acquis, Extraterritorial Protection and the Common Market of Deflection
(Martinus Nijhoff, 2000).
23. See Guild et al. (2015), op. cit. supra note 15, pp. 54 and 55.
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Belgium and Sweden, but also a selection of border States in the south and east
(Malta, Cyprus, Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary).24 Other countries at the external
border, however, such as Spain, Portugal, Poland and the Baltic States, are free
riders and receive only very little asylum applicants. On the basis of this data,
it would seem that Dublin results in distribution largely on the basis of
geographic location of the Member States, and to some extent on the asylum
seeker’s preference for lodging an application in a particular Member State. If
the Dublin system were applied in all cases, there would be an even larger
distributive effect towards Member States at popular points of entry into the
EU. Some reports have estimated that in 2014, for example, only half of the
persons entering Italy and asking for asylum somewhere in the EU, were
registered in Italy as asylum seeker.25 The criteria for distributing asylum
seekers laid down in the Dublin Regulation fall short of fair-sharing, as there
is no attempt to make allowances for any State which is particularly burdened,
nor is there any attempt to take into account capacities of Member States to
offer protection. Instead, past26 and current efforts of correcting uneven
burdens are based on voluntary and ad hoc arrangements – normal practice in
the international community at large, but described as “unacceptable within a
European Union committed to close integration between Member States”.27
EU law does provide for some mechanisms of relief: the early warning
mechanism in the Dublin Regulation, the Temporary Protection Directive
(2001/55) and the power of the Council to adopt provisional measures for the
benefit of the one or more Member States confronted with an emergency
situation as laid down in Article 78 TFEU.28 But the present crisis illustrates
the lack of effectiveness of these mechanisms. Although all three mechanisms
make the EU competent as crisis manager, they do not prescribe how burdens
should be shared between the Member States. The early warning mechanism
rather vaguely refers to “guidance on any solidarity measures” and the
Temporary Protection Directive assumes that Member States will receive
displaced persons “in a spirit of Community solidarity”.29 A key reason why
this Directive was not set in motion is that that very spirit has dissipated.
24. Eurostat, Asylum applicants and first instance decisions on asylum applications: 2012,
Issue No. 5/2013.
25. See Guild et al., op. cit. supra note 15, at 55 with further references.
26. See esp. the EU relocation scheme for Malta: EASO fact finding report on intra-EU
relocation from Malta, July 2012.
27. Gray, “Surveying the foundations: Article 80 TFEU and the Common European
Asylum System”, 34 Liverpool Law Review (2013), 175–193, at 176.
28. Art. 33 Regulation (EU) 604/2013, O.J. 2013, L 180/31; Directive 2001/55/EC, on
minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced
persons, O.J. 2001, L 212/12; Art. 78(3) TFEU.
29. Art. 33(4) Regulation (EU) No. 504/2013, O.J. 2013, L 147/1; Art. 25 Directive
2001/55/EC.
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A further free rider element is that it is possible to be part of Schengen, but
not to partake in the Common European Asylum System. Denmark, for
example, has opted out of all EU asylum instruments except the Dublin
Regulation. It actually made use of this opt-out in its decision to halve social
security benefits to refugees so as to make itself less attractive for asylum
seekers. This is arguably in violation of the Refugee Convention but not in
violation of EU law.30 Similarly, Denmark is not taking part in the Council
Decisions to relocate 160,000 asylum seekers who arrived in Greece and Italy.
On the other hand, Denmark fully enjoys the benefits of the Schengen free
travel area and has a ratio of incoming and outgoing requests for Dublin
transfers of 1:3.31 In these various ways, EU law fosters disobedience and free
rider behaviour on the part of Member States. Moreover, Dublin seems to have
created a sense of historic entitlement on the part of some Member States not
to have to share in the burden at all.32 Ironically, now that the traditional
reluctance of quite a few North-Western Member States to revise Dublin
seems to be waning, a new coalition of other Member States has formed who
embrace its non-redistributive effects.
In sum, the European asylum system seeks to coerce both asylum seekers
and crucial Member States to act in ways they have no interest in and
understandably consider unfair. Why should an Afghan refugee accept being
assigned to a Member State which is likely to reject her asylum claim while
another one would in all probability accept it? Why should Greece and Italy
spend considerable resources on registering migrants, with the mere effect
that they get saddled with them on the basis of Dublin? Why should Germany
and Sweden bear the brunt of the failure of the European asylum system, while
most other Member States behave as unresponsive bystanders? In the
Frankfurter Allgemeine,33 Kay Hailbronner described EU asylum law as
“Schönwetterrecht” (good weather law) – created at a time in which refugees
were a marginal issue in the EU. Because EU asylum law is not consonant
with the interests of key players (asylum seekers and Member States), it could
only work if it contained means to coerce them to comply. The problem is not
that there are no judicial enforcement mechanisms, but that there is often no
interest in activating them. Rather than launching procedures in Greece for not
being granted proper relief, asylum seekers travel to another Member State.
30. UNHCR Regional Representation for Northern Europe, “UNHCR Observations on the
proposed amendments to the Danish Social Security legislation”, Aug. 2015.
31. Eurostat, supra note 24.
32. E.g. a Joint Statement on migration of an extraordinary summit of the Prime Ministers
of the Visegrád Group Countries, 15 Feb. 2016, available at <www.vlada.cz/assets/media-
centrum/aktualne/2016_02_15_v4_deklarace_en_1.pdf>.
33. Hailbronner, “Asyl in Europa: Wenn, wie, wann, wo?”,FrankfurterAllgemeine, 10 Dec.
2015.
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And although the European Commission is responsible for ensuring the
proper transposition of EU law and correct application of EU rules by the
Member States, it has only on rare occasions launched infringement
procedures in the area of asylum law.34
2.2. Great expectations at the borders of the European Union
The Common European Asylum System is intimately linked with a
common policy for the external borders. Both were considered a conditio
sine qua non for the lifting of checks at the internal borders.35 Ideally a
European system for the management of the external borders supports and
facilitates a common European migration and asylum policy. However, the
flaws described above clearly resonate within the EU’s border policy, which
suffers from similar free-rider behaviour.
Member States have remained individually responsible for the management
of their part of the external borders. It has become commonplace to state that
the external border is as strong as its weakest link. But what is more important
is that some Member States, due to the length of their borders or their
geographical location, have carried a disproportionate share of this
responsibility. In the case of Greece, it has also been the weakest shoulders
that have had to carry this burden. European “solidarity” has been limited to
financial support, as well as operational support from Member States under
the coordination of Frontex.36 There have thus been few incentives for
Member States to reinforce controls of their part of the external borders as this
will not only trigger their responsibility for asylum seekers under the Dublin
system, but also for the return of irregular migrants under the Return
Directive.37
The incapacity or unwillingness to deal with flows or refugees and irregular
migrants may trigger the reinstatement of internal border controls that
have been witnessed in recent times. Already in 2011, the influx of Tunisians
in Italy in the wake of the Arab spring resulted in a diplomatic clash between
34. See infringement scoreboards published by the European Commission at <www.
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/infringements/in
dex_en.htm#maincontentSec4> and <www.ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/eu-
law-and-monitoring/infringements_by_policy_asylum_en.htm>.
35. Case C-378/97,Wijsenbeek, EU:C:1999:439, para 42.
36. Regulation (EU) 515/2014 of 16 April 2014 establishing, as part of the Internal Security
Fund, the instrument for financial support for external borders and visa and repealing Decision
No. 574/2007/EC, O.J. 2014, L 150/143; Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 of 26 Oct. 2004
establishing a European agency for the management of operational cooperation at the external
borders of the Member States of the European Union, O.J. 2004, L 349/1.
37. Directive 2008/115/EC of 16 Dec. 2008 on common standards and procedures in
Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, O.J. 1998, L 348/98.
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Italy and France, ultimately resulting in the introduction of Article 26 in the
Schengen Borders Code, allowing for the reinstatement of checks at the
internal border in case of a serious deficiency in border controls jeopardizing
the functioning of the Schengen area.38
The focus on border controls, be it at the internal or external borders, is
however fundamentally flawed for three reasons.
First, it overestimates the capacity of borders to bar irregular entry or
prevent secondary movements. Even when internal border controls in Europe
were still fully in place, Member States were at times confronted with large
inflows (e.g. during the wars on the territories of former Yugoslavia), and
secondary movements were a problem already before the Schengen
agreements were negotiated.39 Of course, a militarization of the external
border, as in totalitarian regimes, which can be observed to some extent at the
Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, may reduce the number of irregular
entries at the militarized stretch of the border. However, it comes at enormous
costs, both in terms of the disruption of the flow of border traffic, as well the
cost for setting up and maintaining such border infrastructure, even if
supported with state-of-the-art surveillance and intelligence.40 There is no
such thing as an impermeable border, and a border which gets close (like the
one between the Koreas) is not only inhuman and questionable from a human
rights perspective; it also strangles the economy. For example, reports indicate
that the Hungarian border fence leads to displacement of migration to other
Member States, and is even failing to keep people out of Hungary itself.41
Sealing off all of the 42 673 km of sea borders and 7 721 km of land borders
is simply not a realistic prospect.
A second flaw of the present focus on external border control is that
tightened border controls will worsen the humanitarian crises at the external
borders. Border controls do not address the root causes of migratory and
refugee flows.They will make access to Europe more difficult and result in the
emergence of new routes, which are the harder, longer and more dangerous
ones. As the past twenty-five years have shown, this will increase the reliance
of people trying to reach Europe on human smugglers, and it will increase the
38. Regulation (EC) 562/2006 of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the
rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), O.J. 2006,
L 105/1.
39. See Peers, “The refugee crisis: What should the EU do next?”, EU Law Analysis blog,
8 Sept. 2015, available at: <eulawanalysis.blogspot.nl/2015/09/the-refugee-crisis-what-should-
eu-do.html>, with reference to Hurwitz.
40. See e.g. the recent report of the Bertelsmann Stiftung at <www.bertelsmann-
stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/NW_Departure_from_Sch
engen.pdf>.
41. BBC News, “Europe migrant crisis: Razor wire fence failing in Hungary”, at <www.
bbc.com/news/world-europe-35624118>.
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number of border deaths.42 To the extent that tightened borders do succeed in
keeping people out, the result will be that many will remain in limbo: unable
to return to their country of origin and stuck in countries in the EU’s
neighbourhood which themselves are not in the position to provide for a
minimum of assistance. This is the situation on the Balkans right now. Even if
these people are not in direct need of international protection, it does not mean
that they are devoid of rights.
A third flaw of the approach to borders is legal in nature. Not only
practically, but also legally border controls as a solution to curb refugee flows
are not feasible. Although international refugee law does not allow for a right
to be granted asylum, there is a binding obligation of non-refoulement, i.e. not
to return a person (either directly or indirectly) to a country where there is a
risk of persecution. This obligation applies also at the border and on the high
seas,43 and applies within the EU as a general principle as well as under
Article 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. EU secondary law
provides for a right to asylum or subsidiary protection once the conditions of
the Qualification Directive have been fulfilled.44 The Procedures Directive
clearly states that an asylum request can also be made at the border, and the
Schengen Borders Code provides in numerous provisions that its application
shall be without prejudice to these rights.45 Member States can apply the
concept of a European safe third country in order to declare an asylum request
inadmissible. However, this concept cannot be used for the immediate return
of refugees at the border. Its application is bound to strict conditions and
safeguards, including individual assessment and judicial control.46 In a
consistent line of cases, the European Court of Human Rights has also made it
clear that the return of third country nationals requires an individual
assessment of the personal circumstances of the person involved and that mere
identification does not suffice if it is to respect the prohibition of collective
42. See e.g. Last and Spijkerboer, “Tracking deaths in the Mediterranean” in Brian and
Laczko (Eds.), Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost During Migration (International
Organization for Migration, 2014), pp. 85–106.
43. ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, Appl. No. 27765/09, judgment of 23 Feb. 2012.
44. Art. 13 (“shall grant”), Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 Dec. 2011 on standards for the
qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international
protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection,
and for the content of the protection granted (recast), O.J. 2011, L 337/9.
45. Art. 3(1) (“scope”), Directive 2013/32/EU of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for
granting and withdrawing international protection, O.J. 2013, L 180/60.
46. Arts. 38 and 39 Directive 2013/32/EU of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for
granting and withdrawing international protection (“Procedures Directive”), O.J. 2013, L
180/60.
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expulsions in Article 4 of Protocol 4 to the ECHR.47 Currently Member States
put all their cards on qualifying Turkey as a European safe third country,48 but
such a policy can only succeed if proper asylum procedures and judicial
control are organized in Greece.
2.3. Prohibition outside the territory of the European Union
The external dimension of European refugee policy is based on prohibition.
The guiding principle is that refugees and asylum seekers are not allowed to
travel. This was implemented initially by harmonizing European visa
policies. Until 1990, each Member State had its own visa policy, based on
historical ties, trade relations and international politics. This meant that
citizens of most countries in the world could reach at least one Member
State without a visa. In the framework of the 1990 Schengen Implementing
Agreement, these policies were gradually harmonized. Since 2001,
Regulation 539/2001 enumerates the third countries whose nationals must
have a short-term visa when crossing external borders, and those whose
nationals are exempt from the visa requirement. Nationals from all
refugee-producing countries are subject to a visa requirement, and therefore
cannot legally enter the EU without one.49 Simultaneously, the technical
quality of documents was improved drastically, with the consequence that it
became much more difficult to travel on forged documents. The Schengen
Implementing Agreement also harmonized the externalization and priva-
tization of the visa requirement by means of carrier sanctions.50 This has
47. ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy; ECtHR, Georgia v. Russia (I), Appl. No. 13255/07,
judgment of 3 July 2014; ECtHR, Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, Appl. No. 16643/09,
judgment of 21 Oct. 2014; ECtHR, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, Appl. No. 16483/12, judgment
of 1 Sept. 2015.
48. Whether it would be lawful to qualify Turkey as a safe third country is questionable;
see Roman, Baird and Radcliffe, “Why Turkey is not a ‘safe country’”, Statewatch, Feb. 2016,
and the sources quoted there; Ulusoy, “Turkey as a safe third country?”, available at <www.law.
ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2016/
03/turkey-safe-third>.
49. Mau et al., “The global mobility divide: How visa policies have evolved over time”, 41
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (2015), at 1192–1213.
50. Art. 26 obliges the signatory States to oblige carriers (such as airlines) to ensure that
passengers are in possession of the required documents (including visas), and to impose fines
for carriers who fail to do so. Art. 4 Directive 2001/51/EC of 28 June 2001 supplementing the
provisions of Art. 26 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June
1985, O.J. 2001, L 187/45, provides that the minimum fine will not be less than ¤ 3 000 and the
maximum not less that ¤ 5 000 per passenger. See more extensively Rodenhaüser, “Another
brick in the wall: Carrier sanctions and the privatization of immigration control, 26
International Journal of Refugee Law (2014), at 223–247.
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resulted in a considerable decrease in the number of people applying for
asylum at European airports.
The successful enforcement of the harmonized visa policies by airlines
closed off one route to Europe. Asylum seekers and refugees were still able to
travel to countries neighbouring the European Union, and to try to enter
European territory from there. In the context of the Schengen process,
European States began harmonizing their safe third country policies, which
had their roots in German and Dutch asylum policy in the late 1970s.51 The
central notion was that, if asylum seekers are returned to third countries for
their claim to protection to be assessed, they will figure out that it is fruitless
to come to Europe and will stop coming. This notion of automatic return
without individual assessment was at the core of the 1993 German
constitutional reform.52 A harmonized version of the safe third country
concept is laid down in Articles 35, 38 and 39 Directive 2013/32. Even apart
from the legal obstacles (such as the possibility for the individual to rebut the
safety of the country concerned in the individual case, see above), during the
past 40 years application of the safe third country principle on a scale of any
significance has been prevented by the third countries’ obstruction or outright
refusal to readmit asylum seekers and refugees. An exception is the
cooperation between Spain and the North-African and West-African
countries from where boat people approached Spanish territories, which
seems to have led to a radical drop in the number of people trying to reach
Spain by boat (and the subsequent increase of boat people trying to reach
Italy).53
Apart from trying to return asylum seekers and refugees to third countries,
European States have also sought to cooperate with neighbouring countries in
51. Marx, Asylrecht. Band 2: Rechtsprechungssammlung mit Erläuterungen (Nomos,
1991), pp. 163–1200; Zwaan, “Veilig derde land: De exceptie van het veilig derde land in het
Nederlandse asielrecht”, dissertation Catholic University of Nijmegen, 2003, pp. 87–108 and
199–215; Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (CUP, 2005), pp.
293–296, 323–333; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 3rd ed.
(OUP, 2007), pp. 391–407.
52. See e.g. Hailbronner, “Asylum law reform in the German constitution”, 9 American
University International Law Review (1994), at 159–179; Marx and Lumpp, “The German
Constitutional Court’s decision of 14 May 1996 on the concept of ‘safe third countries’: A basis
for burden-sharing in Europe”, 9 International Journal of Refugee Law (1996), at 419–439.
53. Godenau, “An institutional approach to bordering in islands: The Canary Islands on the
African-European migration routes”, 7 Island Studies Journal (2012), pp. 3–18; Godenau,
“Irregular maritime migration in the Canary Islands: Externalisation and communautarisation
in the social construction of borders”, 12 Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies (2014), pp.
123–142; López-Sala, “Exploring dissuasion as a (geo)political instrument in irregular
migration control at the southern Spanish maritime border”, 20Geopolitics (2015), at 513–534.
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order to prevent departure from there to Europe, and to prevent the entry into
these countries of people who might subsequently try to travel onwards to
Europe. Until 2011, Italy sought to cooperate with Libya, with a measure of
success varying according to the negotiation tactics used by the Libyan
Government.54 Since the outbreak of the armed conflict in Syria,
Algeria, Egypt,55 Libya, Morocco and Tunisia have introduced visa
requirements for Syrians,56 most likely under pressure from the EU. This
made it harder for Syrians to access the well-functioning route from the
Libyan coast to Italy, and may have resulted in a shift of Syrian refugee
migration from the central Mediterranean route to the eastern Mediterranean
route (Turkey-Greece).
Visa requirements for Syrians 2010 (Source: Mau et al.)
54. See e.g. Paoletti and Pastore, “Sharing the dirty job on the southern front?
Italian-Libyan relations on migration and their impact on the European Union”, International
Migration Institute, Working Paper No. 29, 2010.
55. Inter alia UNHCR expresses concern over new restrictions for Syrian refugees in
Egypt, 12 July 2013, <www.unhcr.org/51e03ff79.html>.
56. We have established this by comparing the data of Mau et al., op. cit. supra note 49, with
data from IATA, at <www.timaticweb2.com/home> in Feb. 2016.
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Visa requirements for Syrians 2016 (source: IATA)
To the extent that the EU succeeds in convincing third countries to
cooperate, this logically has onward effects in countries closer to the source
countries of refugees. Lebanon57 and Jordan58 now refuse to admit Syrian
refugees, while Turkey has announced it will only allow Syrians in directly
from Syria,59 but reports hold that two border crossing points have been
closed.60
The effect is that private and public third parties (carriers and third
countries) have been incentivized to prevent refugees from reaching the
territories of EU countries. At the same time, the international community
(including the EU) has not enabled refugees to subsist in the countries where
they find themselves. Let us take Syria again as an example. Syria had an
estimated 23 million inhabitants before the war.61 Since 2011, the conflict has
forced half of the population to flee: 7.5 million refugees within Syria,62 4
57. E.g. Bell, “Lebanon has just done the unthinkable”, Al Jazeera, 6 Jan. 2015, at
<www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/01/lebanon-just-done-unthinkable-201516114349
914185.html>; “Syrians to face visa restrictions for Lebanon”, Al Jazeera 3 Jan. 2015,
<www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2015/01/lebanon-visa-restrictions-syrians-201513102
9059563.html>.
58. On 18 Jan. 2016, the Financial Times reported that 16 000 Syrians were stranded in the
desert at the Jordan border.
59. Kart, “Turkey: No change in visa-regime with Syria, ‘open door policy’ goes on”,
Hürryet, 18 Dec. 2015, at <www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?pageID=238&nID=92
738&NewsCatID=510>.
60. See e.g. Amnesty International, “Injured Syrians fleeing Aleppo onslaught among
thousands denied entry to Turkey”, 19 Feb. 2016, at <www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/
2016/02/injured-syrians-fleeing-aleppo-onslaught-among-thousands-denied-entry-to-turkey/>.
61. <www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Syria>.
62. <www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486a76.html>.
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million outside Syria (635 000 in Jordan,63 or some 8% out of 8 million
inhabitants,64 1 million in Lebanon,65 or some 17% out of 5.8 million
inhabitants,66 2.5 million in Turkey,67 or some 3% out of 77.6 million
inhabitants68). These conservative estimates concern registered refugees; the
actual number of refugees is likely to be much higher. The reception of Syrian
refugees in the region is seriously under-funded. The United Nations Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance reported that for 2015, 56
percent of the required funding had been received.69 The World Food
Programme reports that critical funding shortages forced the organization to
reduce the level of assistance, with most refuges now living on 50 cents a
day.70
Resettlement of Syrian refugees in other parts of the world – crucial in
order to enable especially Lebanon to host Syrian refugees – is not occurring
on a scale of any significance. Since the beginning of the conflict, only
162,151 Syrian refugees have been resettled elsewhere in the world71 – 4
percent of the 4 million Syrian refugees outside Syria, and merely 2 percent of
all Syrian refugees.
The most likely understanding of what happened in 2015 is that the
combination of the prohibition approach to refugees, the lack of resettlement,
and the inability for refugees to get an acceptable form of subsistence in the
region led to a rapid increase in the demand for the services of smugglers on
the Turkey-Greece route. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this initially led to
a sharp increase in prices. The resulting increase in profit margin attracted
more people to the smuggling sector. This led to a rapid increase in supply,
which resulted in falling prices. This triggered others than just Syrians
(refugees such as Eritreans of Afghans as well as non-refugees) to travel to
Europe. This could explain why not only the number of Syrians entering the
EU via Turkey has increased sharply, but that of other nationalities as well.72
In this analysis, the combination of prohibition and not giving refugees a
63. <www.data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107>.
64. <www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Jordan>.
65. <www.data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122>.
66. <www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Lebanon>.
67. <www.data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224>.
68. <www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Turkey>.
69. <www.fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisis&year=2015>.
70. <www.wfp.org/emergencies/syria>.
71. <www.unhcr.org/52b2febafc5.html>.
72. For the most recent data at the moment of writing, see p. 6 of the Frontex Risk Analysis
Report, published 20 Jan. 2016, available at <www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/
Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q3_2015.pdf>. Compare for a similar analysis European Commission,
DG Migration and Home Affairs, “A study on smuggling of migrants: Characteristics,
responses and cooperation with third countries”, Sept. 2015, at <www.ec.europa.eu/dgs/
CML Rev. 2016622 Den Heijer, Rijpma and Spijkerboer
viable alternative in the region has had the opposite effect of the intended one:
it led to more migration, not just of Syrians but also attracting migrants to the
eastern Mediterranean routes who would otherwise not have migrated to
Europe. If this analysis is correct, it exposes a structural problem in European
asylum policy. It combines prohibition and the lack of a viable alternative for
refugees in the region. This disregards the interests of both refugees and of
countries in the region, who have a shared interest in onward movement of
refugees to other regions, for Syrians concretely: to Europe. In order to realize
this shared interest, however, there is no other option than illegality. This
boosts the smuggling economy and attracts service providers to the smuggling
business. The prohibition approach not only incentivizes Syrian refugees to
use smugglers, but also stimulates a smuggling economy which leads to more,
instead of to less migration. In this analysis, European policy completely
backfires and leads to more migration. At present, the data required to put this
hypothesis to the test are lacking, but it is this hypothesis which is in line with
dominant migration sociology,73 and which best explains the data which are
available on irregular migration to Europe in the period since 2011.
2.4. Multi-level governance
Key to understanding some of the failures of the European asylum and
border policies is the fragmented nature of EU governance in these fields.
The Schengen project has proceeded on a basis of mutual recognition and
minimum harmonization. There is no common asylum law, there are no
federal asylum courts, and the EU does not have executive powers. The
implementation of the EU’s policies is fully in the hands of the Member
States. The Member States have steadfastly opposed the formation of a
European corps of border guards and have likewise been unwilling to vest
any executive power in the European Asylum Support Office, which is only
allowed to assist Member States’ asylum authorities.74 The EU has no
operational assets of its own. Moreover, any EU intervention in the field of
asylum and border control requires the consent of the host Member State.
This form of cooperation is vulnerable not only because it allows for
considerable disparities between Member States but also because the
achievement of commonly formulated goals depends on the effective
home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/
study_on_smuggling_of_migrants_final_report_master_091115_final_pdf.pdf>.
73. See for an overview Czaika and de Haas, “Evaluating migration policy effectiveness” in
Triandafyllidou (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of Immigration and Refugee Studies (Routledge,
2016), pp. 34–40.
74. Regulation (EU) 439/2010 of 19 May 2010 establishing a European Asylum Support
Office, O.J. 2010, L 132/11.
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cooperation of Member States. Multi-level governance can function effective
only if the constituent parts identify with their common government and take
seriously their duty to work together towards their common values.75
However, within the field of asylum, national interests are often perceived to
run contrary to Union interests.
The present crisis vividly demonstrates the shortcomings of the European
cooperation model in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. The
unwillingness of Member States to cooperate and their actual resistance to the
system explain the difficulty of making border guards and asylum experts
available to Member States facing a high influx; explain the delays in making
the hotspots in Greece and Italy operational;76 explain why the asylum
systems in the Member States display fundamental differences; explain why
some Member States bear the brunt while others are unresponsive bystanders;
explain why even the financial part of the EU-Turkey deal is not materializing;
and explain why Balkan countries received little and late EU support in
offering basic amenities to transiting asylum seekers. For example, the
European Commission acknowledged that under the EU Civil Protection
Mechanism, which is designed to offer practical support to countries
overwhelmed by a crisis situation, “so far, too few Member States have
responded to … calls” to provide teams, equipment, shelter, medical supplies,
expertise and non-food items to assist the Balkan countries.77
It is also rather odd that UNHCR, which was never intended to function as
operational humanitarian assistance agency but took up that role in States that
were incapable of doing so themselves, has become a key player in aiding
refugees on the Greek islands by providing emergency shelter and support –
forcing UNHCR, which is already facing huge financial and operational
challenges elsewhere, into making new emergency appeals to donors.78
UNHCR is doing the job, because the EU does not have the required mandate
and assets. The deployment of NATO in order to “conduct reconnaissance,
75. Lister, The European Union, the United Nations and the Revival of Confederal
Governance (Greenwood Press, 1996), p. 26 et seq.; Wallace, “Europe as a confederation: The
community and the nation-state”, 21 JCMS (1982), 57–68, at 61.
76. State of play hotspot capacity, 31 March 2015, at <www.ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/press-material/docs/state_of_play_-_
hotspots_en.pdf>.
77. European Commission, “State of play: Measures to address the refugee crisis”,
Press release of 29 Jan. 2016, available at <www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-61
34_en.htm>.
78. “UNCHR aids refugees on the Greek Islands”, at <www.unhcr.org/563ccbb86.html>;
“UNCHR launches appeal to aid refugees as winter hits Europe”, at <www.unhcr.org/
563b4c186.html>.
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monitoring and surveillance of the illegal crossings in the Aegean” also
shows the EU’s lack of operational effectiveness.79
3. The EU strategy for reform
Considering that the root causes of current refugee flow lie beyond the EU’s
regulatory powers in the area of migration and asylum, it seems evident that
the EU should at least try to control what is within the scope of its
competences. And indeed, as far as this is a European refugee crisis, it is a
crisis of the EU’s own making, bearing in mind the flaws in its Common
European Asylum System, both in set-up and implementation, as explained
above.
3.1. Toward a strong common asylum policy?
The European Agenda on Migration describes the current fragmentation of
the asylum system as a weakness, as it contributes to asylum shopping and
leads to a perception in EU public opinion that the current system is
fundamentally unfair.80 It would seem, indeed, that a number of concerns
that we identified above are shared by the European Commission and that
steps are being taken to address these.
First, the Commission proposes a new systematic monitoring process to
strengthen the implementation of the asylum rules.81 In September 2015, a
total of 40 infringement procedures were launched against several Member
States for failing to implement EU asylum legislation, which were taken a
step further in seventeen cases in December 2015 and February 2016.82 Most
of these cases concern the failure of effective fingerprinting of asylum
seekers, failures in transposing the Asylum Procedures Directive, Reception
Conditions Directive and failure to extend the regime of the Long-Term
Residents Directive to refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection.
79. Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting
of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Defence Ministers, 11 Feb. 2016, available at
<www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_127972.htm>.
80. Commission Communication, “A European agenda on Migration”, COM(2015)240
final, at 12.
81. Ibid.
82. European Commission, “More responsibility in managing the refugee crisis: European
Commission adopts 40 infringement decisions to make European Asylum System work”, Press
release of 23 Sept. 2015; “Implementing the Common European Asylum System: Commission
escalates 8 infringement proceedings”, Press release of 10 Dec. 2015; “Implementing the
Common European Asylum System: Commission acts on 9 infringement proceedings”, Press
release of 10 Feb. 2016.
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Second, the Commission proposes to step up operational cooperation
between Member States. European Asylum Support Office (EASO) should
develop into a role as “the clearing house of country of origin information”,
encouraging more uniform decisions. EASO would also step up training of
asylum officers and the suggestion is made that the agency would administer
a network for the pooling of reception places in times of emergency.83
Third, the Commission is not proposing a further approximation of the
Reception Conditions Directive, Asylum Procedures Directive and
Qualification Directive, but it has proposed a common list of safe countries of
origin, which would amend the Asylum Procedures Directive.84 The idea
behind the common list is that all Member States will expeditiously deal with
asylum claims made by persons from countries with generally high
application numbers but low recognition rates, with a view to causing a
deterrent effect and increasing the overall efficiency of asylum systems.
For the longer term, the Commission will initiate debate on further
development of the Common European Asylum System, including a possible
common Asylum Code and the mutual recognition of asylum decisions, and
even “a longer term reflection towards a single asylum decision process”.85
Key, moreover, is that the Commission undertakes an evaluation of the Dublin
system in 2016, which will start the debate over a permanent revision of the
legal parameters for distributing asylum seekers.
On reflection, the proposals in the sphere of further harmonization of
asylum standards are quite meagre. Moreover, on substance they illustrate
rather than address the current limitations of EU law to arrive at a truly
common asylum policy. It is doubtful, for example, whether the safe country
of origin proposal will lead to further convergence, because the legal
consequences of applying the concept are not fully harmonized. The proposal
obliges Member States to regard countries on the common list as safe
countries of origin, but the Procedures Directive leaves it to the Member States
(“may provide”) to decide whether they process applications of persons from
such countries in a border procedure or accelerated procedure (Art. 31(8) Dir.
2013/32). Moreover, the Procedures Directive specifies only in limited detail
what an accelerated or border procedure entails. Some Member States have
rather short accelerated asylum procedures with a maximum duration of only
a few days (such as Malta, Bulgaria and the United Kingdom), but it may take
longer in other Member States such as France (15 days), Poland (30 days) and
Sweden and Greece (three months). And some EU Member States, like Italy
83. Commission Communication, cited supra note 80, at 12.
84. Commission Proposal for a Regulation establishing an EU common list of safe
countries of origin, 9 Sept. 2015, COM(2015)452 final.
85. Commission Communication, cited supra note 80, at 17.
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and Hungary, have no accelerated asylum procedure at all.86 Further, in view
of divergent recognition rates in the Member States, it is quite problematic to
arrive at a common conception of which third countries are safe.87
Likewise, the trend towards the production of European country of origin
reports may well “encourage” (the word use by the Commission) more
uniform decisions, but does not guarantee them. For example, a joint report
written by country analysts from Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and
Sweden about the safety situation in Libya published in December 2014 did
not result in a common approach adopted in individual procedures to the
question whether expulsion to Libya could be executed.88 This is to be
attributed to the fact that the Member States remain largely autonomous in
legally qualifying facts in terms of EU law.
3.2. Relocation and hotspots: A way forward?
There is a growing consensus among academics but also among Member
States that the legal parameters of Dublin must be revised. In September
2015, the European Commission tabled a proposal for a crisis relocation
mechanism, which would function as emergency valve in the Dublin
Regulation.89 We will not enter into the debate of what a revised Dublin
should look like,90 but limit our observations to the functioning of the two
emergency decisions of the Council providing for the relocation of 160,000
asylum seekers from Italy and Greece.91 These decisions by and large
follow the model of the proposed revision of the Dublin Regulation and
could provide a foretaste of the future EU approach. We will show that the
86. See extensively, Meijers Committee, “Note on an EU list of safe countries of origin:
Recommendations and amendments”, 5 Oct. 2015, <www.commissie-meijers.nl/sites/all/
files/cm1515_an_eu_list_of_safe_countries_of_origin.pdf>.
87. ECRE reported e.g. that the recognition rate for Albanians (Albania is on the proposed
list) during the first quarter of 2015 varied from 0% in The Netherlands and Ireland to 54% and
33% in Italy and Switzerland; see ECRE Comments on the Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council establishing an EU common list of safe countries of
origin and amending the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (COM(2015)452), Oct. 2015,
available at <www.ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/1231-ecre-
argues-against-a-common-eu-list-of-safe-countries-of-origin-.html>.
88. OCGRSP, “Report Libya: Security Situation”, 19 Dec. 2014; Rb. Den Haag, 21 July
2015, NL:RBDHA:2015:8479.
89. Commission Proposal for a Regulation establishing a crisis relocation mechanism,
9 Sept. 2015, COM(2015)450 final.
90. See e.g. Guild at al., op. cit. supra note 15; Adviescommissie voor
Vreemdelingenzaken, op. cit. supra note 15.
91. Council Decision 2015/1523 of 14 Sept. 2015, O.J. 2015, L 239/146; Council Decision
2015/1601 of 22 Sept. 2015, O.J. 2015, L 248/80.
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relocation mechanism is not working as intended,92 because it is still based
on the idea of coerced transfer; is premised on a distorted idea of solidarity;
and because the EU has neither the mandate nor operational capacity to
implement the mechanism.
The relocation mechanism centres on the concept of hotspots, introduced in
the Agenda on Migration, which would take on an increasingly important
meaning in the year to follow. In areas of high migratory pressure, EASO,
Frontex and Europol would work on the ground with what are now frequently
called “frontline” Member States swiftly to identify, register and fingerprint
incoming migrants and asylum seekers. Frontex was to become the main actor
in setting up these hotspots.93 In fact, the concept was first coined in a
consultancy study on the feasibility of a European system of border guards.94
This prominence of Frontex seems to contradict the multi-actor approach
underlying the hot spot concept, and once more demonstrates the focus on
border control as opposed to protection needs.
Although the relocation system takes account of the private, family and
personal circumstances of asylum seekers in making relocation decisions, it
does not require the consent of the persons involved.95 NGOs report that
relocation is not popular among asylum seekers because they have no idea of
where they will be sent96 – while, as indicated above, they have high stakes in
ending up in some Member States and not in others. The reality is that the
majority of arrivals are not going through the hotspots, but elect to relocate
themselves. Although the combination of a distribution key coupled with
so-called “matching” looks good on paper, UNHCR reports that matching
takes place not on the basis of asylum seekers’ needs or preferences, but on the
basis of Member States’ indications of what kind of persons they are willing
92. As of 10 Feb. 2016, 218 persons were relocated from Greece and 279 from Italy; see
Annex 4 to the Commission Communication on the state of play of implementation of the
priority actions under the European agenda on migration, COM(2016)85 final.
93. See also Commission Proposal for a Regulation on the European border and coast
guard, 15 Dec. 2015, COM(2015)671 final, Art. 17.
94. Unisys, “Study on the feasibility of the creation of a European System of Border Guards
to control the external borders of the Union”, ESBG, June 2014, at <ec.europa.eu/dgs/
home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/border-crossing/docs/20141016_home_
esbg_frp_001_esbg_final_report_3_00_en.pdf>.
95. Recital 34: “Therefore, in order to decide which specific Member State should be the
Member State of relocation, specific account should be given to the specific qualifications and
characteristics of the applicants concerned, such as their language skills and other individual
indications based on demonstrated family, cultural or social ties which could facilitate their
integration into the Member State of relocation”.
96. De la Baume, “Why the EU’s refugee relocation policy is a flop”, Politico, 6 Jan. 2016,
available at <www.politico.eu/article/why-eu-refugee-relocation-policy-has-been-a-flop-front
ex-easo-med>; see also UNHCR, “Building on the lessons learned to make the relocation
schemes work more effectively: UNHCR’s recommendations”, Jan. 2016.
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to accept.97 This is selection rather than matching. The importance of
procuring consent of the asylum seeker was noted by EASO in its evaluation
of the Malta relocation scheme: “In general, respondents asserted that
relocation should always be a voluntary decision both on the side of the
beneficiary and that of the receiving country. If the voluntary aspect is
removed, integration difficulties might arise, which could lead to secondary
movements.…”98 This does not necessarily mean that voluntariness is an
absolute requirement for a distribution system to work, but it is likely to
contribute to its effectiveness.
Although the second relocation decision distributes asylum seekers in
accordance with a key in which GDP and population size are the primary
determinants, its full implementation would only result in an even more
unbalanced distribution of asylum seekers among the Member States. Apart
from capping the total relocation number at 160,0000 (thus assigning each
person above that number entering Greece and Italy to those countries), the
Decisions only apply to those nationalities whose applications have a 75
percent recognition rate (i.e. Syrians, Iraqis and Eritreans), making Italy and
Greece de jure responsible for processing all other nationalities. That Greece
is organizing buses to the border with Macedonia instead of to a relocation
hotspot and is accused of other forms of feet-dragging demonstrates its
ambivalence towards the scheme, which is, however, perfectly
comprehensible. At the receiving end, the distribution key hardly considers
whether a Member State has already taken in a high number of asylum
applications. Member States which are already doing more than their share
such as Sweden, Austria or Germany are only allotted more asylum seekers in
the relocation decisions.99
A major liability of the relocation system is that it depends on the consent
and operational capacity provided by twenty-five Member States (excluding
the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark). The European Commission
identified as main bottlenecks the time it takes to get approvals from receiving
Member States and the low number of relocation pledges by Member
States.100 The Commission also reports that insufficient officers are made
97. According to UNHCR, some Member States have attached to their indications a long
list of preferences and additional limiting conditions related to inter alia language skills and
vulnerabilities. Other Member States have limited places to just one of the qualifying
nationalities due to a lack of interpreters, or have explicitly excluded vulnerable cases; Ibid.,
at 6.
98. EASO, “Fact finding report on intra-EU relocation activities from Malta”, July 2012,
available at <www.refworld.org/pdfid/52aef8094.pdf>.
99. The distribution key does take previous intake into account, but with a 10% weighting.
100. Commission Communication, “Progress report on the implementation of the hotspots
in Greece”, 15 Dec. 2015, COM(2015)678 final, at 3.
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available to EASO and Frontex, and that too little humanitarian aid and means
of transport, such as buses, are made available to the EU Civil Protection
Mechanism.101 Delays in registration have discouraged asylum seekers from
applying for relocation, and delays in executing transfers have caused asylum
seekers to abscond.102 As UNHCR has stressed, an absolute prerequisite for
the successful implementation of the relocation schemes is the availability of
adequate reception capacities, not only to ensure the presence of asylum
seekers throughout the procedure but also to make the deal attractive to them.
Greece struggles, however, in making these facilities available, and is further
urged to provide leaders for EASO and Frontex teams, as well as interpreters
and legal aid.103
In short, the relocation mechanism would seem to be the proverbial cart
before the horse. It is premised on a functioning asylum system, which is
absent in Greece and also, though to a lesser extent, in Italy; and it is premised
on the willingness of other Member States to share the burden, a willingness
which is also mostly absent. The mechanism is failing, because it is built on
existing weaknesses in the fabric of the common European asylum policy.
3.3. Towards a shared management of the external borders?
The European Agenda on Migration’s short-term response to the refugee
crisis consisted of a reinforcement of joint operations under the coordi-
nation of Frontex and the establishment of EU-Navfor, a Common Foreign
and Security Policy mission targeting human smugglers.104 Although still a
civilian mission, more precisely a police mission with military means,
EU-Navfor is not a border management operation. The legal framework
within which it operates is indicative of the security dimension that this
crisis has taken in the eyes of European policy makers.
Long term, the Agenda announced “reflections” on the shared management
of the European border. This would include a European System of Border
Guards, as well as a possible European Coast Guard.105 Within the context of
the refugee crisis it only took a few months to move from reflections to a
concrete proposal in December 2015 to transform Frontex into a European
Border and Coast Guard Authority.106 A number of factors played a role in the
101. COM(2016)85 final, Annex 2.
102. UNHCR, cit. supra note 96.
103. Supra note 101.
104. Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 of 18 May 2015 on a European Union military
operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED), O.J. 2015, L 122/31.
The operation has since been named “Sophia”.
105. Commission Communication, cited supra note 80, at 17.
106. Commission Proposal, cited supra note 93.
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momentum for such proposal. Politically it was very important to counter the
image of uncontrolled flows of people entering the European Union. The
management of the external borders now became a prerequisite to save
Schengen. It would allow for the “economic” migrant and potential terrorist
to be separated from the “genuine” asylum seeker and individual Member
States would be disciplined into either remedying the deficiencies in their
border controls or forcing them to put human and technical resources at the
disposal of Frontex.
Already in 2002, in its Communication on European Border Management,
the Commission had contemplated the establishment of a true European corps
of border guards, disposing of executive powers independent from the
Member States.107 Resisting this move, Member States in the Council adopted
Frontex as a regulatory agency tasked merely with the coordination of
Member State cooperation. Frontex’s powers and resources have been
consistently reinforced in the first decade of its existence, however always
resisting a true centralization and transfer of executive power.108 From that
point of view, the Commission’s proposal constitutes an evolution rather than
revolution, because it does not change that fundamental premise.The proposal
does qualify border management as a shared responsibility and makes the
Agency responsible, as a primus inter pares, for a European strategy for
integrated border management, with which national strategies must be in
line.109 The two biggest innovations however are the obligation to make
border guards available for joint operational activity, as well as the power for
the Agency to intervene in emergency situations irrespective of an EU
Member State’s approval, based on a prior Commission decision.
The Commission proposal is also significant in that it proposes giving
Frontex an important role in the evaluation of Member States’ border
management systems (“vulnerability assessment”) through the posting of
liaison officers in the Member States. This would reinforce the Schengen
Evaluation System as adopted in 2011 under which the Council can issue an
implementing decision with recommendations for improvement.110 Under the
107. Commission Communication, “Towards integrated management of the external
borders of the Member States of the European Union”, 7 May 2002, COM(2002)233 final,
at 22.
108. See in more detail Rijpma, “Frontex and the European system of border guards: The
future of European border management” in Fletcher et al. (Eds.), The European Union as an
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Routledge, 2016 forthcoming).
109. De Bruycker, “Solidarity as a sovereignty-reducing penalty for failing to meet
responsibility in the European Border and Coast Guard”, at 13–15, available at <www.ody
sseus-network.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Searching-for-Solidarity-Short-Papers.pdf>.
110. Council Regulation (EU) 1053/2013 of 7 Oct. 2013 establishing an evaluation and
monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis and repealing the
Decision of the Executive Committee of 16 Sept. 1998 setting up a Standing Committee on the
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proposed Regulation the Agency could issue such a decision with corrective
measures.
It is questionable whether the proposal as it stands will be acceptable to the
Member States. Indeed, in the Council negotiations, the “right to intervene”
was deleted and the obligation to make border guards available weakened.111
Still, what was initially contemplated as a long-term solution is now
presented as a quick fix. Making the EU and its Member States jointly
responsible for the management of the external border sounds good in
practice, but as long as the Agency does not have actual powers of command
and control, it seems to remain a legal fiction.
3.4. Toward legal channels for forced migration?
Although the provision of legal channels for forced and voluntary migration
is an oft-repeated mantra, the outcome in relation to this element in the
Agenda is almost nil, and not likely to amount to much in the near future.
The EU has not changed its visa policies for the countries of origin of
asylum seekers and refugees, nor has it changed its carrier sanction policy.
Countries neighbouring source countries have imitated the European
prohibition paradigm, either under European pressure or because they saw
no other option. In the European Agenda on Migration, the Commission
announced that it aims at an EU-wide resettlement scheme for 20 000
refugees per year, to be distributed over the Member States on the basis of
criteria such as GDP, size of the population, unemployment rate and past
numbers of asylum seekers and refugees. The target of 20 000 should be
reached in 2020.112 The Commission adopted a Recommendation asking
Member States to resettle 20 000 refugees over a period of two years, based
on a distribution key.113 More specifically, as a beginning of the cooperation
with Turkey (see below), the Commission adopted a Recommendation for a
evaluation and implementation of Schengen, O.J. 2013, L 295/27; see the Council
Implementing Decision setting out a Recommendation on addressing the serious deficiencies
identified in the 2015 evaluation of the application of the Schengen acquis in the field of
management of the external borders by Greece, Doc. 5985/16, 12 Feb. 2016.
111. See for a consolidated text as put together by Peers on the basis of Council Documents
6359/1/16, 6884/16, 6652/16 and 6744/16: Statewatch Analysis, “The EU Border Guard takes
shape”, 13 March 2016, <www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-285-eu-border-guard.pdf> (last
accessed 21 March 2016).
112. Commission Communication, cited supra note 80, at 4–5.
113. Commission Recommendation of 8 June 2015 on a European resettlement scheme,
COM(2015)3560 final. A number of 5,331 persons were due to be resettled in 2015, with
confirmation that only 779 had been resettled. 22,504 refugees are due to be resettled by the end
of 2017, see Commission, “Refugee crisis: Commission reviews 2015 actions and sets 2016
priorities”, Press release of 13 Jan. 2016, at <europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-65_en.htm>.
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voluntary readmission scheme with Turkey, which should lead to re-
settlement of Syrian refugees from Turkey in the EU.114 These resettlement
numbers are minimal, and no reports on the implementation of even this are
available.
Return policies are to be improved by pressuring third countries to take
back their own nationals residing irregularly in Europe,115 where necessary
with an EU laissez-passer and spurred by European Migration Liaison
Officers.116 This will be enforced by high-level dialogues at the EU level,
regular bilateral meetings, enhanced cooperation and – where necessary – the
use of “adequate leverage”,117 most notably visa policy – even though the
Commission itself notes that this is hardly useful as the relevant countries are
subject to visa requirements not likely to be lifted.118 Development
cooperation and trade policies are mentioned as additional sources of
leverage.119 Existing fora such as the Rabat and the Khartoum Process will be
fully used to enhance cooperation on readmission.120 A pilot project with
Pakistan121 and Bangladesh will show the way forward.122 Furthermore,
North-African countries must be motivated to readmit third country nationals
who transited through their territory,123 and will be stimulated to return
migrants to their country of origin before they try to reach Europe.124 The
Commission will explore ways to expand the support provided by Frontex to
114. Commission Recommendation of 15 Dec. 2015 for a voluntary humanitarian scheme
with Turkey, C(2015)9490.
115. Commission Communication, cited supra note 80, at 9; the Commission’s approach is
supported by the Council, EUCO 26/15, 16 Oct. 2015, at 2(o), (p), and (q).
116. Commission Communication of 9 Sept. 2015 on the EU Action Plan on return,
COM(2015)453 final, at 9.
117. Ibid., at 10. A term used in this respect is also improving the coherence of EU policy,
COM(2015)285 final, at 9.
118. Commission Communication, cited supra note 116, at 14.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid., at 11.
121. Pakistan has begun to implement what could be termed reverse carrier sanctions. It
returns people deported from Europe back to Europe if they are not properly documented, and
has threatened carriers with fines. See e.g. Haider, “30 deportees from Greece sent back after
being held at Islamabad airport”, Dawn, 3 Dec. 2015, at <www.dawn.com/news/1223954>;
Yousaf. “Illegal migrants: Deportation deal back on track, says EU official”, Tribune, 25 Nov.
2015, at <www.tribune.com.pk/story/997196/illegal-migrants-deportation-deal-back-on-tra
ck-says-eu-official>; “Successful talks held with EU on deportation of Pakistanis”, The News,
14 Nov. 2015, at <www.thenews.com.pk/print/15815-successful-talks-held-with-eu-on-dep
ortation-of-pakistanis>.
122. Commission Communication, cited supra note 80, at 10–11.
123. Commission Communication, cited supra note 116, at 11; cf. COM(2015)285 final,
at 8.
124. Commission Communication, cited supra note 116, at 13.
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countries in the EU’s neighbourhood.125 In order to assist countries of origin
and transit to cooperate in readmission, the EU will focus on “readmission
capacity building”, which consists of “development of centralized automated
civil registers and of systems for issuing biometric passports and identity
documents, launching automated means of transmitting and processing
readmission requests (such as fingerprinting machines), or providing material
resources necessary for processing readmission requests and receiving
returnees, such as means of transport or temporary accommodation
facilities”.126
In the Agenda on Migration, the Commission envisions to promote
stability in Libya and Syria, as well as providing humanitarian, stabilization
and development assistance inside Syria and helping Syrian refugees in
countries like Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq.127 The EU will help to
mitigate the impact of the refugee crisis at the local level by being a major
donor.128
Concrete examples of the intention to combine the prohibition approach
with assistance to refugees in the region are the EU plans on Turkey and the
Western Balkans. On 15 October 2015, the Commission announced an
EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan,129 which was welcomed by the Council,130 and
which was implemented in March 2016.131 The plan has the dual aim of
supporting Syrians in Turkey, and of preventing migration to the EU. As to the
125. Ibid., at 8.
126. Ibid., at 12–13; cf. in the context of human smuggling COM(2015)285 final, at 9.
127. Commission Communication, cited supra note 80, at 5, refers to “¤ 3.6 billion in
humanitarian, stabilization and development assistance inside Syria and to help Syrian refugees
in countries like Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq”.
128. Ibid., at 8: “The EU is a leading international donor for refugees with EUR 200 million
in ongoing projects from development assistance and over EUR 1 billion of humanitarian
assistance dedicated to refugees and IDPs since the beginning of 2014. A strategic reflection is
now under way to maximise the impact of this support, with results expected in 2016”.
129. Commission, “Fact Sheet: EU-Turkey joint action plan”, 15 Oct. 2015,
MEMO/15/5860, at <www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5860_en.htm>.
130. Meeting of heads of state or government with Turkey: EU-Turkey statement of 29 Nov.
2015, Statements and Remarks 870/15, at <www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-
pdf/2015/11/40802205539_en_635846527200000000.pdf>.
131. Statement of the EU Heads of State or Government of 7 March 2016, at <www.
consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/07-eu-turkey-meeting-statement/?utm
_source=dsms-auto&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Statement+of+the+EU+Heads+
of+State+or+Government%2c+07%2f03%2f2016>; EU-Turkey Statement, Press release of 18
March 2016, at <www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2016/3/40802210113_en_635
939208600000000.pdf>. Notably, this important agreement is laid down in a Press release. Is
this an international treaty? If so, Art. 218 TFEU provides for a procedure to be followed,
which has not been activated so far. However, it is clearly “an international agreement con-
cluded between States in written form and governed by international law” in the sense of Art.
2(1)(a) VCLT.
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first aim, the EU pledges to mobilize new funds, 132 notably through the EU
Trust fund for the Syrian crisis, while Turkey promises to continue giving
international protection to Syrian refugees. The EU is to contribute ¤ 3
billion in 2016 and 2017, with ¤ 1 billion to be financed from the EU budget
and ¤ 2 million by Member States.133 The first ¤ 95 million projects were
announced on 4 March 2016.134 As to the second aim, the EU pledges to
support Turkey in combating migrant smuggling and irregular migration,
while Turkey agrees to strengthen its interception capacity, and smoothly
readmit irregular migrants who entered the EU via Turkey.135 In March, the
EU and Turkey agreed to return “all new irregular migrants” to Turkey as of 20
March 2016. For every Syrian returned to Turkey, another Syrian will be
resettled from Turkey to the EU. The Commission has proposed to use 54 000
places which were reserved for relocation from Greece and Italy for
resettlement from Turkey.136 It is not clear which Syrians would benefit, and it
is not clear which Member States would accept Syrians from Turkey, nor is it
clear what legal status the Syrians should have (the proposal speaks of
“resettlement, humanitarian admission or other forms of legal admission”137).
The first reports on the implementation of this plan reveal a number of legal
issues.Asylum seekers seem to be routinely detained, which does not sit easily
with Article 26 of Directive 2013/32/EU (the Procedures Directive), which
provides that asylum seekers shall not be detained for the sole reason that they
have applied for asylum. Furthermore, the provision that “all new irregular
migrants crossing from Turkey into the Greek islands as of 20 March 2016
will be returned toTurkey” suggests that the EU intends to engage in collective
deportation, which is contrary to Article 4 Protocol 4 to the ECHR. On the
other hand, it is foreseen that all migrants will be allowed to apply for asylum
in accordance with European law. Whether and how the tension between the
132. Commission, “EU-Turkey cooperation: A ¤ 3 billion refugee facility for Turkey”,
Press release of 24 Nov. 2015, at <www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6162_en.htm>.
133. Council, “Refugee facility for Turkey: Member States agree on details of financing”,
Press release of 3 Feb. 2016, at <www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2016/2/4080
2208322_en_635901838200000000.pdf>.
134. Commission, “EU announces first projects under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey:
¤ 95 million to be provided for immediate educational and humanitarian assistance”, Press
release of 4 March 2016, at <www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-584_en.htm>.
135. Art. 4 of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on
the readmission of persons residing without authorization, O.J. 2014, L 134/3, provides that
Turkey shall readmit without formalities third country nationals in an irregular situation if, inter
alia, they have illegally and directly entered the territory of a Member State after having stayed
on, or transited through, the territory of Turkey.
136. Proposal of 21 March 2016 for a Council Decision amending Council Decision (EY)
2015/1601 of 22 Sept. 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international
protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, COM(2016)171 final.
137. Ibid. at 2.
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intention of the EU-Turkey agreement (return of all migrants) and
international and European asylum law (under which return to Turkey is
evidently problematic, see footnote 48 above) can be resolved remains to be
seen.138 UNHCR has announced that it does not want to be involved in
implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement,139 while other humanitarian
organizations likewise have pulled out from activities which could support
it.140 Further elements also bode ill for the viability of the agreement.
Immediately after the EU-Turkey agreement, the Turkish ambassador to the
EU indicated that Turkey is not willing to give up the geographical limitation
to the Refugee Convention, which results in Turkey not having obligations
under the Refugee Convention for non-European refugees (such as
Syrians).141 Furthermore, hours after the agreement was reached, Amnesty
International reported that Turkey expelled Afghans in violation of
international law,142 consistent with earlier reports on refugee law violations
by Turkey.143 Both gestures suggest that Turkey may not see an interest in
being a safe third country. One of the elements of the EU-Turkey cooperation,
which is meant to incentivize Turkey, is visa liberalization and re-energizing
the accession process with Turkey.144
138. For first analyses of the agreement, see Peers, “The final EU/Turkey deal: A legal
assessment”, 18 March 2016, at <www.eulawanalysis.blogspot.nl/2016/03/the-final-euturkey-
refugee-deal-legal.html>; the interviews with Hathaway and Hailbronner at <www.
verfassungsblog.de/three-legal-requirements-for-the-eu-turkey-deal-an-interview-with-james
-hathaway/> and <www.verfassungsblog.de/legal-requirements-for-the-eu-turkey-refugee-
agreement-a-reply-to-j-hathaway/>; and Labayle and de Bruycker, “L’accord Union
européenne-Turquie: Faux semblant ou marché de dupes?”, 23 March 2016, at <www.eum
igrationlawblog.eu/laccord-union-europeenne-turquie-faux-semblant-ou-marche-de-dupes/>.
139. “UNHCR redefines role in Greece as EU-Turkey deal comes into effect”, Briefing
Notes of 22 March 2016, <www.unhcr.org/56f10d049.html>. For UNHCR’s view on the legal
aspects, see “Legal considerations on the return of asylum-seekers and refugees from Greece to
Turkey as part of the EU-Turkey Cooperation in Tackling the Migration Crisis under the safe
third country and first country of asylum concept”, 23 March 2016, at <www.refworld.org/
docid/56f3ee3f4.html>.
140. MSF, “Greece: MSF ends activities in the Lesvos ‘hotspot’”, 22 March 2016, at
<www.msf.org/article/greece-msf-ends-activities-inside-lesvos-%E2%80%9Chotspot%E2%
80%9D>.
141. At <www.euobserver.com/migration/132779>.
142. Amnesty International, “Turkey has forcibly returned dozens of Afghans despite
Taliban persecution risk”, 23 March 2016, at <www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/turkey-has
-forcibly-returned-dozens-afghans-despite-taliban-persecution-risk>.
143. Amnesty International, “Europe’s gatekeeper: Unlawful detention and deportation of
refugees from Turkey”, 16 Dec. 2015, available at <www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur
44/3022/2015/en/>.
144. See e.g. Council Conclusions of 16 Oct. 2015, EUCO26/15, at 2(2); IP/15/6162;
Meeting of heads of State or government with Turkey, “EU-Turkey statement of 29 Nov. 2015,
Statements and Remarks 870/15”, at <www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2015/11/
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On 25 October, a meeting was held in Brussels with representatives of
Greece, Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Slovenia,
Hungary, Austria and Germany.145 Together, these countries form the
corridor between Turkey and the heart of the European Union. The three main
points of the action plan are to provide more shelter along the route; to register
migrants (under the rubric of “migration management”); and to combat
irregular migration (under the rubric “border management”). For providing
shelter, it was specifically agreed that Greece would increase its reception
capacity to 30 000 places by end 2015,146 while UNHCR was to provide for at
least 20 000 more people; “financial support for Greece and UNHCR is
expected”. Further along the route, UNHCR was to increase reception
facilities by 50 000 places.147 In order to manage migration flows together, it
was agreed that all arrivals were to be registered, that information about them
would be exchanged and that return policies were to be intensified. For
combating irregular migration, the action plan emphasizes cooperation with
Turkey (see above), as well as intensifying cooperation in the field of border
controls (Operation Poseidon Sea, support for various land border controls in
the region, among which 400 police officers to be deployed through bilateral
arrangements in Slovenia within a week148). In February 2016, the EU
framework was disregarded by a meeting of Croatia, Slovenia and Austria
(with Bulgaria as an observer) with “the Western Balkan 6” (i.e. Albania,
Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia & Herzegovina) which
sought border closure and put less emphasis on refuge rights.149 One of their
conclusions – “It is not possible to process unlimited numbers of migrants and
applicants for asylum” – can be taken as a direct rebuff of Angela Merkel’s
“Wir schaffen dass”. This move by a limited number of Member States, in
cooperation with non-Member states, and excluding crucial states like
40802205539_en_635846527200000000.pdf>; EU-Turkey Statement, Press release of 18
March 2016, at <www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2016/3/40802210113_en_635
939208600000000.pdf>.
145. Commission, “Meeting on the Western Balkans migration route: Leaders agree on
17-point plan of action”, Press release of 25 Oct. 2015, at <www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release
_IP-15-5904_en.htm>.
146. From the State of play report of 15 Dec. 2015, it seems clear that Greece has not
implemented this (in the column “what remains to be done”, it is stated: “Create the extra
23,000 places committed by Greece to reach the 50,000 target”); see Commission, “Managing
the refugee crisis: Western Balkans route: State of play report”, at <www.ec.europa.eu/dgs/
home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/
western_balkans_route_state_of_play_report_en.pdf>.
147. Ibid., states that 20 000 of these have been created.
148. Ibid., mentions that 200 had been deployed by then.
149. General Secretariat of the Council, “Conference ‘Managing Migration Together’,
Vienna, 24 Feb. 2016”, 25 Feb. 2016, 6481/16.
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Germany and Greece, underlines the lack of agreement among Member States
on the approach to be taken and on the Common European Asylum System.
So we can see that the prohibition approach is intensified, not just by
stepping up enforcement at the European external borders (including
collective returns to Turkey), but also by pressuring Turkey to expand visa
obligations. At the same time, promises are made about resettlement and more
funding for refugee assistance in the region, but these are not operational.
Also, all attention is focused on Turkey, while Lebanon and Jordan (facing a
substantially bigger problem than Turkey, but with no shared borders with the
EU) do not receive substantial attention. In addition, while the idea is that
Turkey will patrol Europe’s borders and readmit refugees and asylum seekers,
there is very little attention for why Turkey would have any interest in doing
so, or why Turkey would find it fair to shoulder a much bigger part of the
refugee issue than Europe is willing to. Therefore, to the extent that the
intensification of the prohibition approach is successful, it is likely to boost
the market for smuggling services, and hence to increase irregular migration
towards Europe. This is all the more likely as elements in the EU’s response in
2015 which might contribute to interrupting the smuggling market cycle
(increasing assistance capacities in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey;
resettlement) are barely worth the paper they are written on.
3.5. Toward federalization?
In suggesting a longer term reflection towards establishing a single asylum
decision process and a common asylum code, the Commission does appear
to recognize the limitations of the current approach. This is in line with
what seems to be a growing discourse on the need for transferring more
competence to the EU, including the power to decide on individual asylum
applications. Goodwin-Gill, for example, observed recently that “[t]he
strategy of implementing a common policy through twenty-eight national
systems … was always bound to fail, no matter how comprehensive the
top-down, legislative agreement on qualification, standards and criteria”.150
He suggests setting up a European Migration and Protection Agency
competent “to fulfil collectively and to implement the individual obligations
of Member States”. Hailbronner also suggests the transfer of competence
for implementing a single asylum procedure, to be carried out in central
reception centres in the hot spots. Appeals procedures should in
150. Goodwin-Gill, “Refugees and migrants at sea: Duties of care and protection in the
Mediterranean and the need for international action”, Notes for a Presentation at Jean Monnet
Centre of Excellence on Migrants’ Rights in the Mediterranean, University of Naples
L’Orientale, 11 May 2015.
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his view only be based on EU asylum law and should be dealt with by
specialized EU courts.151 There are also several reports calling for cen-
tralized asylum decision-making.152 The question is whether this could be
done on the current Treaty basis of Article 78(2) TFEU. Although some
argue that implied in this article is that asylum decisions need to be made by
the Member States (Art. 78(2)(e) TFEU refers to establishing rules for
determining responsibility), we do not believe such transfer of power would
be impossible on the basis of this article in view of the Treaty’s clearly
stated objective of a Common European Asylum System.
Although we share the analysis behind these suggestions, we are
nonetheless hesitant in embracing federalization as panacea for the current
failures. There are certain risks to a further transfer of competences which
need to be thoroughly thought through. It could add a further level of
fragmentation whereby competences at the EU level may interfere with
national competences and vice versa. Decisions on asylum applications may,
for example, have legal effects in the spheres of detention, reception, return
and relocation. Centralizing status determination without a concurrent
transfer of power in the spheres of border control, return and detention (as is
proposed by ALDE, for example153) will give rise to complex issues of
cooperation between Member States and the EU. As long as Member States
remain responsible for executing part of the EU asylum policy (detention,
return, relocation), the system is vulnerable. There are also a range of practical
issues, such as the question which Member State becomes responsible for
taking in failed asylum seekers whose return cannot be effectuated.
There are also important constitutional limits to the transfer of executive
powers to Union bodies outside the EU institutions. It is true that in the ESMA
case the Court limited the effects of the Court’s anti-delegation (“Meroni”)
doctrine, by allowing for the establishment of agencies with decision-making
power as “operational support mechanism” in the internal market.154 It seems
tempting to transpose that logic to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.
However, it is submitted that border management is essentially a policing
power, which may involve the use of force and coercion, which requires a level
of discretion that is difficult to regulate, in any case in absence of a European
rules of engagement. In this different policy context, the limitations of the
151. Hailbronner, op. cit. supra note 33.
152. Guild et al., op. cit. supra note 15, at 59; Carrera et al., “What priorities for the new
European agenda on migration?”, CEPS, 22 April 2015.
153. ALDE, “Roadmap to get a grip on the refugee crisis”, 28 Jan. 2016.
154. Case C-270/12, UK v. Parliament and Council (“ESMA”), EU:C:2014:18; see also
van Cleynenbreugel, “Meroni circumvented? Article 114 TFEU and EU regulatory agencies”,
21 MJ (2011), 64–88, at 87.
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Meroni doctrine, such as the need for a precise delimitation of powers, will
apply much more readily.155
Although a full transfer of powers to a European Asylum Authority or
European Border Agency would have the obvious advantage of a clear-cut
division of responsibility, it would require judicial review of decisions taken
by these agencies, such as against the refusal to grant asylum or a decision to
deny entry at the border. As such an agency would be a European body, an
appeal against its decisions would have to be brought before the CJEU.156 One
could envisage a novel system, following the example of the proposal for a
European Public Prosecutor’s Office, under which delegates of the European
agencies would operate within specific Member States, subject to the control
of national courts.157 There are some signs that the hotspot approach is moving
in that direction. The Greek Government tabled a bill in February 2016 for a
new detention and reception regime in the hotspots, which would grant EASO
and FRONTEX the power to observe or participate in reception and
identification procedures.158 In theory, this model could be extended to give,
to the extent deemed necessary, EU agencies delegated executive power under
Greek law. Such arrangements obviously depend on Greek cooperation and
consent, but seem more feasible than the federalization of
asylum-decision-making.
A full centralization of powers of in border management would also
undermine the constitutional principle that the Member States are ultimately
responsible for their own internal security (Art. 4(2) TEU and Art. 72 TFEU).
This point was first raised in 2007 when an amendment to the Frontex
Regulation introduced the obligation to make national border guards available
for Rapid Border Interventions. That obligation was therefore qualified,
allowing Member States to refuse deployment of their national border guards
when “faced with an exceptional situation substantially affecting the
discharge of national tasks”.159 The removal of this exception, as well as the
power to intervene without the request of a Member State, in the current
proposal for a European Border and Coast Guard Agency, seem to encroach
upon this principle. It also seems rather odd that whereas the Treaty explicitly
155. See Rijpma, op. cit. supra note 108.
156. Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, EU:C:1987:452.
157. Commission Proposal of 17 July 2014 for a Council Regulation on the establishment
of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, COM(2013)534 final.
158. ECRE, “New Greek law to include detention regime in ‘hotspots’”, Press release of
12 Feb. 2016.
159. Art. 4(3), Regulation (EC) No. 863/2007 of 11 July 2007 establishing a mechanism for
the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and amending Council Regulation (EC) No.
2007/2004 as regards that mechanism and regulating the tasks and powers of guest officers, O.J.
2007, L 199/30.
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states in relation to Eurojust and Europol that coercive measures remain with
the Member States, a similar limitation would not apply to a European Border
Agency, which would be based on the much more broadly formulated Article
77(2)(d) TFEU.160
As we argued above, the present “confederal” model is likely to work more
smoothly if the Member States have a sincere interest in cooperating. In view
of the legal, practical and political constraints to federalization, it is all the
more imperative that the right incentives are put into place for Member States
as well as asylum seekers to work with instead of against the system. We agree
that the Commission should be invited to play its role as guardian of the treaty
more forcefully, but one cannot hope the Union, be it in a federal or confederal
constellation of governance, to enforce compliance with a system which
meets resistance on so massive a scale.
4. Conclusion
The European response to the refugee policy crisis is premised on an
intensification of the prohibition of the cross-border movement of refugees,
combined with neglect of the position of refugees in the region. It is
unlikely that even the number of resettlements proposed by the Commission
(which are entirely inadequate) will be realized. The prohibition approach to
refugee movement is both unrealistic (refugees are bound to seek safety,
whether we like it or not), and it is illegitimate morally (Art. 14 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights grants everyone the right to seek
asylum) as well as legally (the principle of non-refoulement). At the external
borders, the European response does not do away with the unrealistic
expectations of what borders can achieve, because it is assumed that border
controls can bring down the number of migrants, and because policy makers
still dream on about push-backs without meaningful individual assessment.
In the Common European Asylum System, the uneven sharing of the burden
among Member States and the drastic divergence in the protection afforded
by Member States to refugees remain to be addressed.
It has to be emphasized that the present European crisis is a crisis of refugee
policy, not a refugee crisis. The numbers in themselves are not the problem;
the way in which the European Union deals with them is. The direction in
which the European Union is now taking asylum law and policy mainly
reproduces, and in important ways intensifies, those elements of EU law and
policy which have caused the crisis. Therefore, the EU response is likely to
make the crisis worse.This is tragic, all the more so because it is not necessary.
160. Arts. 85 and 88 TFEU.
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A less disastrous approach would require doing away with the tunnel vision in
which EU policy makers are presently caught – would require doing away with
the idea that if policy doesn’t work, more of the same policy is the appropriate
response. It would require a reconsideration of the very foundations of the
Common European Asylum System: coercion, prohibition, unrealistic
expectations of what borders can do, and a confederate approach without
addressing legitimate concerns of Member States, third States and refugees.
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